Assessing military intervention and democratization: by Masters, Daniel S. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina Wilmington
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
Assessing Military Intervention and Democratization:  
Supportive Versus Oppositional Military Interventions 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Democratization is a common foreign policy goal for established democratic states and has been 
promoted by a variety of tools from sanctions to military force.  Research, to data has been 
ambiguous with regards to the success of military intervention and democratization.  Most 
studies agree change occurs, although the nature of the change is debatable. This study sifts the 
post-World War II military interventions to assess whether the regime change post intervention 
is democratic.  The data suggest democratically intended military interventions do not result in 
democratization. However, interventions that oppose the existing political elites do yield positive 
results in democratization. 
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Introduction 
In 2002, the Bush Administration advanced the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) as 
part of its counterterrorist strategy following the 9/11 attacks, which advocates democracy 
promotion as an antidote to persistent political violence. The MEPI is not unique as it reflects a 
long-standing tendency among established democracies to advocate democracy promotion as a 
cure-all for political ailments in target countries. Still, like most outcomes of war little is truly 
understood about the impact of military intervention on the constitutional regime of the target 
state. We know that democratic states favor democracy promotion.
1
 However, we must 
distinguish the intent from the outcome in order to assess the relative utility of military force as a 
foreign policy tool to promote democracy. Does military intervention yield progress in 
democratization? Moreover, does military intervention, for the purpose of democratization, yield 
an impact on regime change that is distinct from other types of military intervention? Answers to 
these questions have yielded inconsistent results. At best, we can ascertain that military 
intervention does impact the polity of the targeted state.
2
  However, we do not have a clear 
understanding of the actual changes in the target state’s regime. Many studies indicate a positive 
relationship between military intervention and democratization.
3
 Nevertheless, other studies 
suggest no relationship between military intervention and democratic regime change.
4
  
There are two persistent problems in evaluating aggressive democracy promotion. First, 
there is an issue as to how the data is interpreted with regard to changes in a target country’s 
political system. Most studies use the Polity index to measure regime characteristics and interpret 
any progressive movement on the polity scale as democratization.
5
 In the strictest sense, this 
claim is accurate.
6
 However, such an interpretation passes over qualitative factors of polity 
scores in the lower ranges as they approach zero (the range referred to as anocracy). As a result, 
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there is a tendency in the scholarship to claim democratization in a target state, when in reality 
the state has weakened, become less consolidated or institutionally inconsistent.
7
  
Second, previous studies do not evaluate the political impact of democratic military 
interventions against military intervention for other, more general purposes. Regime change is a 
likely outcome of war, particularly for the losing side.
8
 If the outcome of aggressive democracy 
promotion is no different than the outcome of general military intervention we must question the 
general utility of military intervention as a specific tool for democracy promotion, particularly if 
the outcome is negative. Regime change may be a product of military interventions, but the 
specific product of the regime change may be beyond the control of the intervening state.  
This study proceeds in two parts. First is a review of previous work on aggressive 
democracy promotion to highlight the logic and history of democracy promotion as a foreign 
policy goal among established democracies. The review of the literature critiques problems 
associated with data interpretation especially as it relates to the Polity data. The second part of 
this study provides an empirical examination of aggressive democracy promotion. The goal is to 
provide a rigorous evaluation of the impact of military intervention on changes in the regimes of 
target states. The study closes with an assessment aggressive democracy promotion as a foreign 
policy tool to determine if it has been oversold as a foreign policy option.  
 
Aggressive Democracy Promotion 
The “Liberal Grand Strategy” of promoting democracy, as part and parcel of a nation’s foreign 
policy, is often treated as a uniquely American endeavor. Without a doubt U.S. rhetoric has led 
the charge into democratization efforts over the past century, holding up post-war 
democratization in Japan and Germany as shining examples. Moreover, the U.S. has committed 
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itself to helping new democracies consolidate power and to “aid democratic transitions”.
9
 
However, the U.S. is not alone in this effort. First, forced regime change (democratic or 
otherwise) is a common behavior among great powers throughout history.
10
 States use regime 
change as a measure of their ideology’s success
11
, and regime change is understood as a best 
practice to ensure compliance with the interests of the dominant state.
12
 Second, U.S. efforts are 
supplemented with actions by other actors in the international system when it comes to force 
democratic regime change. The United Nations has adopted democracy promotion as a strategic 
goal within the context of peacekeeping missions and European powers invested in creating 
democratic institutions as they made plans to relinquish colonial possessions.  
For example, Great Britain saw democratization as an essential part of decolonization. 
This position is best illustrated by John Lugard (1994), who in the late 19
th
 Century argued that 
the eventual self-governance for Africans was best advanced by establishing democracies 
modeled on the European parliamentary style of government.
13
 France’s colonization attempts in 
Africa reflect a similar goal.  France originally had no intent to sever ties with its African 
colonial acquisitions; it was simply going to make them French. The assimilation plan was 
quickly scrapped for association, which involved establishing French style democracy across its 
African holdings.
14
  In this light, the U.S. liberal grand strategy is clearly not a new idea, or even 
a uniquely American concept.  The behavior of forced regime change, and aggressive democracy 
promotion are ingrained into the world order.  
Yet, all this work by states and institutions to promote democracy returns us to the 
question of ‘why?’  Why would states wantonly spend their military resources and political 
capital in the pursuit of democracy in other states?  The preoccupation with spreading democracy 
reflects a larger liberal view on how to create a stable world order.
15
  United States policy to 
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pursue a liberal peace has remained constant since Woodrow Wilson. The general belief being 
that if countries are more democratic, it will be easier to establish advantageous trade and 
economic policies, and maintain stable diplomatic relations.
16
  In his 1994 State of the Union 
address, then President Bill Clinton reaffirms, “The best strategy to build a durable peace is to 
support the advance of democracy elsewhere.”
17
  This sentiment was echoed by national security 
advisor Anthony Lake (1994), who argued that advancing democracies, “[S]erves our interests”.  
The promotion of democracy is viewed as a “compelling national interest”, making it a central 
security interest for U.S. policy makers.
18
   
Underneath the goal of democracy promotion is the assumption that democracy can be 
generated from an external source. However, there is little empirical support for this assertion. 
Most studies on regime change suggest it is driven by internal factors virtually independent of 
external forces.
19
 Moreover, Samuel Huntington (1984) suggests that democratization must flow 
from internal forces in order for any semblance of real democracy to be retained over time.
20
 
Inarguably, there are numerous factors influencing the probability of successful democratization. 
These factors run the gamut from economic (per capita income, export dependent economy) to 
political (history of democracy), to cultural (western, liberal values, ethnic homogeneity) to 
name a few.
21
 A large volume of research has shown these internal factors affect the ability of 
states to democratize successfully. Yet most targets of external democratic interventions contain 
negative records on these factors, meaning the probability of successful democratization is low.
22
 
Within the small body of democratization literature which attempts to assess external factors of 
democratization, the general consensus is “how little can be done” by external actors.
23
   
Despite the general consensus that democratization is an internal process, recent studies 
on Aggressive Democracy Promotion (ADP) insist the opposite is true, that outside actors can 
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affect regime change in their target states. Military interventions remove roadblocks on the path 
of a state’s internal shift towards democracy. Interventions can instigate regime change by 
removing dictators from power or breaking up old elite structures.
24
 Additionally, the promise of 
democracy juxtaposed to the more recent bad memories of dictatorship is a sufficient force to 
stabilize a new democratic regime installed by an outside actor.
25
 The logical merit of external 
intervention notwithstanding, the observed relationship between democracy and external intervention is 
murky. It is this particular issue that we turn our attention to now.  
 
Evaluating the ADP Research Program 
The ambiguity of findings on aggressive democracy promotion is a product of the general lack of 
scholarly research on the consequences of war overall. Although the ‘causes of war’ and war 
itself have been extensively studied, little has been made of its aftermath.  Many reasons exist for 
this lack of scholarship.  First, the aftermath of war has often been seen as less important than the 
cause or conduct of war.  Second, the consequences of war provide such a vast terrain; 
economic, political, and social, that it is overwhelming to try and narrow any one aspect to 
attempt a study on the effects.
26
 In toll, there is a dearth of scholarly analysis, and there are 
relatively few theories to guide research.   
 However, the dearth of analysis does not mean there is none. In one exemplar study 
William Thompson (1993) suggests that losers in war were more likely to experience violent 
regime change. This finding supports an argument for the use of aggressive democracy 
promotion. If war is capable of producing regime change, then the victor state has the ability to 
affect the replacement regime. Democratization can be accomplished by encouraging “free and 
fair elections” in the post-intervention phase.
27
 Democratic regime change can also be 
accomplished by traditional nation building activities, such as building civil society and 
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institutions.
28
 Several recent studies report findings that support the potential to generate 
democracy as part of a military intervention.  For example, Meernik (1996) compares rates of 
democratization in states not targeted for military intervention to states targeted for military 
intervention and found that the targeted states are more likely to experience democratic growth.  
Hermann and Kegley find when regime change occurs after a military intervention it is more 
likely to produce liberalization within the political regime.
29 
 Although these studies indicate the promise of military intervention to promote 
democratization they all suffer from various flaws in their analysis. First, several studies define 
military intervention broadly to include applications of force like humanitarian missions.
30
 
Failure to separate interventions intent on affecting the target regime versus humanitarian 
missions and other such actions, “misses the point.”.
31
 Humanitarian missions are fundamentally 
different in nature as they are intended to provide relief and comfort to the civilian population. 
Including humanitarian missions in a study on forced regime change mistakenly broadens the 
phenomena to include many irrelevant cases. 
 A second problem stems from a common misreading of the measures for democracy.  
Extant research relies on the Polity IVd scale on the democratic tendencies in a state. Studies 
showing a positive outcome for aggressive democracy promotion tend to label any movement 
along the polity scale in a positive direction as “liberalizing”, thereby constituting evidence of 
democratization.  Attempts to define liberalization and democratization as the same phenomenon 
are inaccurate.  The two processes often occur in tandem, however they are separate and distinct 
and either can occur without the other.  Liberalization refers to the expanding of rights to 
individuals or groups.  Democratization refers to the process of creating an institutionalized 
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system of government.
32
  Autocratic states can experience “liberalization” by allowing women to 
vote (in the not free and fair elections) yet this does not make them more democratic. 
The Polity dataset specifically measures only institutional democracy and does not 
attempt to capture aspects of liberalization.  Polity IVd assesses institutional democracy and 
autocracy on a scale of -10 (strong autocratic) to +10 (strong democratic). Democratic and 
autocratic features are measured separately and the two scores are summed to give the final 
polity score.
33
  Strong autocratic states score from -10 to -6 on the combined polity scale. 
Anocracies, defined as politically weak central governments or as regimes that mix democratic 
with autocratic features, score from -5 to +5 on the combined polity scale. States are considered 
democratic if they score +6 to +10 on the polity scale.
34
 For a state to serve as an example of 
democratization its polity score would need to would have to cross the threshold from autocracy 
or anocracy to democracy. In reference to the polity score, a state would need to move from a 
score of less than +5 to a score equal to or greater than +6 on the combined scale. Movement 
within the negative range does not indicate democratization, or even liberalization.  It is merely 
indicates weakening and destabilization of the authoritarian or anocratic regime.  
Meanwhile, the intent of aggressive democracy promotion is to generate healthy, stable 
democratic states which can become allies to the democratic powers. Action that destabilizes a 
state decrease the chance democracy will continue post intervention and provide a reliable new 
addition to the liberal world order. More precisely, new democracies are “[M]ore aggressive and 
war prone.”.
35
 Recently democratized states experience a “rocky transitional period” wherein the 
polity is weakened and mixes volatility with authoritarian elite politics. These findings correlate 
to studies by Gates (2004) and Enterline and Greig (2008), which concluded aggressive 
democracy promotion is politically destabilizing.
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One additional hole in the literature is a general failure to compare the impact of military 
intervention with the intent to promote democracy (aggressive democracy promotion or ADP) to 
military intervention for other purposes (general military intervention or GMI hereafter). As 
stated above, losers in war are likely to experience some degree of regime change.
36
 By 
extension, the victorious state can ultimately shape the nature of the replacement regime in order 
to elevate democratic institutions and practices, if they so choose. In other words, the intent of 
the intervention matters to the nature of the replacement regime. However, this particular finding 
has not been evaluated. If ADP yields democratization while GMI produces no specific changes 
to the polity then ADP is a successful foreign policy tool. However, if the polity shift from ADP 
is not significantly different from regime shifts caused by GMI it undercuts the utility of military 
interventions for the specific purposes of democratization. This study attempts to address this 
missing piece of the literature.  
Analyzing Aggressive Democracy Promotion  
There are numerous factors which can affect a state’s political regime. However, the goal of this 
study is to isolate the effects of military interventions on democratization. To that end, we 
explore the effects of military interventions for two outcomes: The effect of military intervention 
on the democratic shift of a polity, and variation between aggressive democracy promotion and 
general military intervention on the target state. If aggressive democracy promotion is a viable 
foreign policy approach target states should demonstrate positive changes in their polity as a 
result of the military intervention, and interventions for specific purposes of democratization 
should be a significant contributor to the positive shift over general military intervention.   
Data on military interventions is taken from the International Military Intervention (IMI) 
Dataset.
37
 The IMI provides the most accurate and exhaustive list of international uses of 
9 
 
military force. The dataset codes multiple variables in relation to the individual interventions, 
such as type of mission (e.g. humanitarian, border dispute). The IMI defines military intervention 
as “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, sea borne, shelling, etc.) of one country 
into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops 
already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or 
dispute.”.
38
  The IMI excludes actions taken by covert forces, and is effectively broad enough to 
accurately reflect the limited military actions of the post World War II period.   
 For purposes of this study observations are restricted to interventions that include 
conventional military forces that involve traditional (declared) wars and police actions.  
Clandestine missions and humanitarian interventions are excluded. Conventional military 
missions, regardless of intent, are fundamentally different from covert operations.  Traditional 
military forces are visible and apparent to actors in the arena where they operate, and use overt 
force to advance their goals and objectives. Covert operations on the other hand are, by 
definition, not visible actors.  Often covert operations involve arming insurgents or rebels within 
a state to carry out military actions. As such, covert military action is fundamentally different. At 
the same time, humanitarian missions provide aid and comfort to civilians, and almost always 
restrict forces from engaging in conflict, making them fundamentally distinct from traditional 
military action and thereby ineligible for this study.  
 Military interventions for purposes of democracy promotion are defined as any 
intervention where the initiator is a consolidated democracy. A consolidated democracy is 
defined as any state with a Polity score of +6 or greater along the Polity IVd scale.
39
 To isolate 
cases where the intervention is for purposes of democratization we searched the public record on 
each case for public statements that indicate the intent to democratize the target state as a 
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primary strategic goal. Public statements were culled from the New York Times Archives, BBC, 
Foreign Relations Documents of the United States (FRUS), and the United Nations online 
Document Archive. These data are coded as a dummy variable (DEMINT), where an 
interventions for purposes of democracy promotion are coded as one (1), and general military 
interventions are coded as zero (0).
40
     
 Democracy is measured using the Polity IVd dataset.
41
 The core measurements of the 
Polity index focus on the openness of competition for executive recruitment, constraints placed 
on the chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. The polity variable 
measures a state’s democratic features (+1 to +10) and autocratic features (-1 to -10) and then 
sums these separate scales to provide the Polity “Score” (-10 to 10). To measure the effects of 
military intervention on the polity of a target state, we coded the Polity score for the target state 
1-year prior to the start date of the intervention and 1-year after the end of the intervention, and 
five years post-intervention.
42
  
One reason for ambiguity in previous research on military intervention relates to the 
inconsistent use of the democracy measure (Polity IIId or Polity IVd in most cases). In twelve 
previous studies, on military based democracy promotion from 1994 to 2008, reviewed for this 
analysis we observe the Polity index used in ten. In those ten studies, only two use a consistent 
formulation of the Polity variable, where the dependent variable measures liberalization as (One-
Year post intervention score – One-year prior to intervention), and democratization as a 
dichotomous variable where 1 is when a target state moves above +6 on the polity scale and 
stays above +6 for a three year period, all other cases below +6 are 0.
43
 The remaining eight 
studies all use the Polity index in different ways. For example, Gleditsch et al (2004) measures 
regime change as a 2-point shift in the polity score, Peceny (1999) as movement above +6 on the 
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Democracy scale only (not the full index), Meernik (1996) uses three ordered categories 
(negative change, no change, or positive change), Gates and Strand (2004) use a significant 
change dummy variable, Hermann and Kegley (1996) as the (polity index score x concentration) 
and (1998) as any movement up or down the polity scale. The range of different formulations of 
the dependent variable speaks to a core issue in studies of this nature: what constitutes regime 
change (generally) and democratization (specifically)? The general conclusion is to define a 
degree of “significant” change based on fluctuation in the target state’s Polity score, and to 
assess if the change observed relates to the treatment of “military intervention.” All efforts in this 
regard show a general misunderstanding of the Polity index.  
 The aggregate Polity scores should not be treated, strictly speaking, as interval level 
data.
44
 There is actually wide variation between states clustered in the higher and lower ranges of 
the polity scale (+6 to +10, and -6 to -10 respectively). The middle of the polity scale (-5 to +5) 
captures characteristics of an anocratic political regime, or a semi-democracy (defined by a 
mixture of democratic and autocratic traits).
45
 It is best to deal with these problems by either 
disaggregating the polity scale to correct the bias in the variable or by grouping states based on 
the autocracy, anocracy, democracy categories. The latter method is a better solution when the 
polity scale is the dependent variable (as is the case in this study), the former solution is best 
when polity is an independent variable.
46
    
To incorporate “shifts” in a state’s polity each state is coded as an autocracy (-1), a 
democracy (+1) or an anocracy (0) in the year prior to the military intervention and again in the 
first and fifth year post-intervention. The score for the year prior to the intervention is subtracted 
from the year post and five year post-intervention. A positive polity shift is a condition where a 
state scores a +1 or more in the change from pre-intervention to post-intervention. Therefore, a 
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shift from autocracy to anocracy, anocracy to democracy, or autocracy to democracy would 
register as a positive polity shift. Negative polity shifts are reversed, with a -1 or more difference 
in the pre and post-intervention polity score. So any state that moves from democracy to 
anocracy, anocracy to autocracy, or democracy to autocracy will register as a negative polity 
shift. Positive shifts in the polity score are coded as 1, and negative shifts are coded as -1, no 
shift is coded as 0.
47
    
Control variables for this study include several concepts related to: historical-political 
contexts of the target state (previous polity condition, colonial history, democratic history, and 
instances and degrees of sate failure), direction of support in the military intervention, and finally 
population and gross domestic product (GDP). The previous polity category is the one-year pre-
intervention polity category (democracy, anocracy, or autocracy). The previous polity category 
variable assumes that a target state’s present is shaped (to some degree) by its past. The outside 
military action is an intervening event that may provide only modest changes to a target state’s 
polit. The polity of the country may be conditioned more by habit than by intervention.  
The history of colonization variable is measured as a target state with any colonial history 
were recorded as “1”, while target states without a colonial history were recorded as “0”.  The 
history of past colonization often results in a future where the previous colonial power is inclined 
to interfere in the politics and government of the state, even to the point of continuing to push for 
democratization in that state.
48
  
Previous research suggests that democratic history, more than any other variable, is a 
strong and positive predictor of democratic transition.
49
 There is a certain logical limit to the 
importance of democratic history for a target state. We cannot assume a democratic history that 
may be hundreds of years removed from the era under study would have any direct relationship 
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to democratic transitions in the Post-World War II era. Therefore, to include a democratic history 
variable  that is relevant to the time period under analysis we constructed a dummy variable 
where “1” indicates any target state with a history of stable democracy (+6 on the polity scale) at 
any time since the beginning of World War II (1936), but prior to the military intervention. Any 
state that did not demonstrate a history of stable democracy since the beginning of World War II 
is labeled as “0”.   
A final political context variable relates to state failure. State failure serves both as a 
pretext for military intervention, and clears away political barriers from the previous regime that 
may prevent democratic political institutions and practices from establishing themselves. Thus, 
state failure is likely to correspond to regime change. However, this study does not make any a 
priori predictions on the direction of the relationship between state failure and regime change. 
State failure will lead to changes to a state’s polity. However, we cannot assert with any certainty 
that the shift will be positive or negative as both outcomes are likely. To measure state failure we 
used the PITF-State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance (1955-
2006), which measures four distinct types of state failures.
50
 The particular variable of interest is 
the Failure of State Authority scale (MAGFAIL), which measures state failure on a scale of 1 to 
4, where 1 as adverse regime change with no weakening of state institutions, 2 failure of state 
authority in limited part(s) of the country, 3 failure of state authority in substantial parts of the 
country, and 4 complete collapse (or near total failure) of state authority. We added in zero to 
indicate a condition of no state failure in the year of the military intervention.
51
  
Additional control variables attempt to capture important elements of the social context 
related to the target state. One such variable indicates the direction of the intervention within the 
target state.  The IMI dataset codes a complex variable measuring the direction of an intervention 
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within the target state. This variable includes support or opposition of the target state’s current 
regime, support for or opposition to rebel forces and support or opposition for a challenging 
group.  We collapsed this variable into a dummy variable indicating either support (1) or 
opposition (0) to the government in power in the target state.  Interventions can remove barriers 
to democratization within a state by removing resisting elites from power.  Therefore, this 
variable controls for whether the elites were supported by the intervention or if the elites were 
the target. If the military intervention opposes the current regime, we contend it will positively 
impact the democratic trajectory of the target state. If the military intervention supports the 
current regime, then it will negatively impact the democratic trajectory of the target state. 
Finally, we included the GDP of the target state and population of the target state as final control 
variables. 
 
Analysis of Aggressive Democracy Promotion 
Democratization, it is assumed, is a common foreign policy goal among established democratic 
states. However, military intervention for purposes of democracy promotion is not the most 
prominent form of military intervention launched by democratic aggressor states. Since World 
War II Aggressive Democracy Promotion clearly has periods of popularity (See Figure 1). In the 
Post-World War II era, aggressive democracy promotion peaks in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
rebounds in the 1960s, and again in the late 1980s to the late 1990s. The 1970s to mid-1980s 
appears to be the nadir of ADP in practice. In comparison with general military interventions 
(e.g. border disputes, humanitarian interventions, etc.) ADP is significantly less common as a 
type of military intervention. For example, during the Post-World War II era aggressive 
democracy promotion accounts for 34 percent of all military interventions. More to the point, the 
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proportion of ADP to all military intervention has declined in the Post-Cold War era (after 1991) 
accounting for only 23 percent of military interventions (See Figure 2). Hence, democracy 
promotion is a common foreign policy goal among established democracies, but it is not widely 
pursued via military means. The issue, though, is not how widely ADP is used, but when it is 
used how well does it perform?  
{Figure 1 about here} 
{Figure 2 about here} 
Generally speaking, aggressive democracy promotion does not appear to have much of a 
discernable impact on the polity of the target state. Looking at ADP target states by its one-year 
pre-intervention category and its one-year and five-year post-intervention category we observe 
very subtle changes in the number of democratic, anocratic and autocratic states in the first post-
intervention measure, and only slightly more pronounced changes in the five-year post-
intervention observation (See Table 1). More specifically, 80 percent of ADP target states 
experience no change in their polity category in the one-year post intervention, and 72 percent 
show no change in the five-year post-intervention observation (see Table 1). Meanwhile, only 11 
percent of target states register a positive shift in their polity category in the one-year post-
intervention and 9 percent experience a negative shift in their polity category. The numbers for 
positive polity changes are more pronounced in the five-year observation point where 17 percent 
of target states experience a positive shift in their polity category, and 11 percent experience a 
negative shift in their polity category. Taken together, the data suggest aggressive democracy 
promotion, at best, has a delayed democratization benefit to the target state. Such a finding is, 
however, dubious as many other intervening factors may account for the 5-year post-intervention 
shift.  
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{Table 1 about here} 
 To illustrate the point more graphically consider the same categorical analysis when we 
shift attention to General Military Intervention (GMI) (see Table 2). The 1-year pre-intervention 
scores are fairly stable to the 1-year post-intervention categories with the exception of autocratic 
states. We see a pronounced drop in the overall number of autocracies one-year following a 
military intervention with nearly a 30 percent drop in the number of autocracies from one period 
to the next. The 5-year post intervention scores are more difficult to discern based on the raw 
data as the number of missing cases, about 18 percent, obscures any conclusions. Looking at the 
data based on percent changes we observe that the number of states experiencing no change in 
their polity category (1-year and 5-year) post-intervention is nearly identical (78 and 77 percent 
respectively). Meanwhile the number of states experiencing positive change is more pronounced 
for GMI target states, particularly in the 1-year post-intervention point (16 percent). More 
noteworthy is that the number of GMI target states experiencing negative shifts in their polity 
category is lower than that of states experiencing ADP military interventions. 
{Table 2 about here} 
 In sum, military interventions do have a subtle impact on the target state. In more than 75 
percent of all cases, the target state experiences no change to its polity. About twenty-two 
percent of states experience some form of change to their polity following military intervention 
(whether it be ADP or GMI). The positive change to a target state’s polity is about the same for 
either form of military intervention (14 and 15 percent respectively). Meanwhile, the negative 
change to a target state’s polity is slightly better for GMI than ADP (8 and 10 percent 
respectively). Therefore, the states that experience change in their polity following a military 
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intervention are slightly better off with GMI than ADP by virtue of being better positioned to 
avoid negative shifts to their polity in the post-intervention period.  
The analysis to this point is only a sketch. To more rigorously test the relationship we 
employ an ordered probit analysis on all cases (423 for the 1-year post-intervention, and 406 for 
the 5-year post-intervention) (see Table 3). The main explanatory variable (Democratic 
Intervention) does not perform well. The direction of the variable is positive, as predicted, to 
suggest that military interventions for purposes of democracy promotion (ADP) are positively 
correlated to changes in a target state’s polity. However, the variable is not significant for either 
the 1-year or 5-year post-intervention models. We cannot reject the null hypothesis in this 
analysis. Moreover, the data here suggests other factors matter more to changes in a target state’s 
polity.   
{Table 3 about here} 
 
Support for the government is both negative and highly significant for both the 1-year 
and 5-year post-intervention periods. Overall the variable performs as predicted. Military 
interventions that do not support the present government (i.e. oppose the government in power) 
result in positive changes to a target state’s polity. It stands to reason that oppositional military 
interventions would likely carry with them an implicit democratization charge, especially since 
the initiating state in this analysis is an established democracy. Hence, there is a probability that 
the support variable may be an intervening variable between democratic intervention and 
democratization. To assess this possibility we conducted two additional assessments on the data. 
First is a Person’s Correlation Coefficient, which does not indicate any significant level of 
correlation between democratic intervention and support for the government (.2039). Second, we 
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conduct separate analyses using only democratic intervention and support for the government in 
each model, there is no change to the direction or significance of either variable as currently 
reported in Table 3 (models are not reported here).  
The findings regarding support for the government and the target state’s polity raises 
some intriguing issues in this study. The data seem to suggest that what matters to the 
democratizing potential of a target state is that military interventions that remove, or weaken, the 
established political elite to allow a different political regime to come together. The intervention 
does not have to have a democratizing intent to have this effect; just a goal to eliminate the 
current regime and oppose the established elite structures. In the wake of the intervention, 
positive changes are observed in the polity of the target state (shift from autocracy to anocracy, 
anocracy to democracy, or autocracy to democracy). At the same time, if a military intervention 
is directed at stabilizing the existing political regime, and maintaining the existing elite 
structures, the intervention will militate against democratic potential within the state. In one 
sense, external forces do have the potential to shape the internal political systems of target states. 
However, the relationship between ADP and democratization may be mis-specified. Rather than 
assume military interventions with democratic intent matters to promoting democracy we assert 
that military interventions opposed to the existing political regime matters. It is a hypothesis that 
deserves more scrutiny.    
Turning attention to the historical-political context variables, the data indicate that the 
previous polity of the target state and democratic history of the target state are significant 
predictors of polity change post-intervention. Meanwhile, history of colonization, magnitude of 
state failure, population and GDP are not significant.  
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The findings on previous polity warrant deeper treatment. The assertion that the polity of 
the country may be conditioned more by habit than by intervention is not supported by the 
evidence. The previous polity variable is negative to suggest that the previous political condition 
of the target state is inversely related to change in the political system in the 1-year and 5-year 
post-intervention periods. The data suggest there is a clear break between the polity of a target 
state pre and post-intervention, and the break results in a change moving in the opposite direction 
of the state’s previous political condition. Hence, states do experience positive changes to their 
polity post-military intervention, but states also experience negative changes to their polity 
following an intervention. Where a state stood prior to an intervention is a good predictor of 
where is will stand after.  
Democratic history performs as expected, positive and significant. This finding is 
consistent with past research to suggest that positive change to a state’s polity is related a past 
experience with democracy. Meanwhile, history of colonization is not significant in either 
model. Magnitude of state failure, population, and gross domestic product are all insignificant 
predictors of polity change.  
In sum this study suggests that democratically intended military interventions do not 
perform well in producing the intended change in the target state’s polity. However, military 
interventions direct against the established government and political elite do produce positive 
changes to the polity of the target state. Moreover, the previous polity of the target state does 
offer information on the direction of change the target state is likely to experience post-
intervention. Taken together, military interventions that oppose governments in autocratic 
political systems may yield positive shifts in the target state’s polity, particularly if the target 
country has a democratic history. The change may be a shift from autocracy to anocracy, 
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anocracy to democracy, or autocracy to democracy. However, military intervention for the sake 
of democratization will yield no discernable result.   
 
Conclusions 
This study set out to evaluate the merit of military intervention as a foreign policy tool to 
promote democracy in targets states. Since the 19
th
 century established democracies, and 
international organizations, have actively promoted democracy as a common foreign policy goal. 
The practice relates to the “Liberal Grand Strategy” idea that democratization will ultimately 
result in an international system populated with stable and peaceful democratic states. Advancing 
democratic interests has led some states to employ military force in order to achieve their stated 
foreign policy goals. The question we are confronted with is, ‘how well does military 
intervention work as a tool for democracy promotion?’ The literature on Democratization is 
fairly clear that it is largely an internal process. At the same time, a separate s body of research 
suggests external intervention is an important catalyst to the democratization process by 
removing certain barriers inside a state, thereby allowing a state to advance its own democratic 
features. The empirical record supports the claim that military interventions result in non-
constitutional regime changes in the participating states, and are most pronounced in the states 
that lose a military engagement. What we are not certain of is whether or not military 
intervention serves as a successful foreign policy tool to bring about democracy in a previously 
non-democratic political system. The research is ambiguous on this conclusion.  
 This study does not definitively resolve the debate on aggressive democracy promotion. 
However, it does add the discussion by highlighting two important pieces of information. First, 
the consequence of regime transformation that results from military intervention seems to be 
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tangential, meaning that it is an outcome beyond the control of the initiating state. If regime 
transformation is a tangential outcome, then military intervention is not an optimal tool for 
democratization. Second, the direct outcome of military intervention appears to be (at this point) 
a weakened state rather than a democratized state. If the underlying idea of aggressive 
democracy promotion is to promote a liberal grand strategy in order to enhance the benefits of 
the democratic peace, we might be better served by addressing the question, ‘what states yield 
the better outcome for peace and stability in the international system: democracies or coherent 
states?’ It seems if the answer to this question is the former, then aggressive democracy 
promotion may still have limited utility as a foreign policy tool, and more work is needed to 
further isolate those conditions where ADP works best. If, however, failed states and incoherent 
states are bigger threats to international peace and stability, then aggressive democracy 
promotion seems to run contrary to that goal, and should be abandoned as a foreign policy tool. 
At this point, further work is needed to isolate the impact of military intervention on 
democratization.    
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Table 1: Changes to Target State’s Polity: Aggressive Democracy Promotion 
Target State’s 
Regime Type  1yr  Pre-Intervention 1yr Post-Intervention 5yr Post-Intervention 
Democracy    17   22   29 
Anocracy   63   59   43 
Autocracy   64   61   63  
 
Total Shift Post-Intervention 
States with a Positive Change    16  (11%)  23  (17%) 
States with No Change    113 (80%)  97 (72%) 
States with Negative Change    13 (9%)  15 (11%) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Changes to Target State’s Polity: General Military Intervention 
 
Target State’s 
Regime Type  1yr  Pre-Intervention 1yr Post-Intervention 5yr Post-Intervention 
Democracy    54                                63                                 51 
Anocracy   111                              119                               92   
Autocracy   133                              94                                 87 
 
Total Shift Post-Intervention 
States with a Positive Change    44  (16%)  32 (14%) 
States with No Change    215 (78%)  177 (77%) 
States with Negative Change    17 (6%)  21 (9%)     
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Table 3: Analysis of Aggressive Democracy Promotion and Polity Shift in Target States 
              
Model      1    2    
One Year Post-Intervention Five Years Post-Intervention 
Democratic Intervention  .128411 (.1559234)  .1772142 (.1426326) 
 
Support for Government  -.5833756 (.1555856)*** -.44735711 (.13971)*** 
 
Previous Polity Category  -1.03649 (.1327253)*** -.9476298 (.1185485)*** 
 
History of Colonization   .0352271 (.1835448)  -.1374055 (.1713346) 
 
Democratic History   .8881421 (.1773213)*** .6553958 (.1637662)*** 
 
Magnitude of State Failure  .0486019 (.0436964)  -.023786 (.0428576) 
 
Population    1.98e-10 (5.68e-10)  -3.85e-10 (4.80e-10) 
 
GDP     1.93e-13 (7.82e-13)  -3.82e-13 (6.86e-13) 
              
Observations     423    406 
LR X
2
 (8)     89.29***   92.36*** 
Pseudo R
2
     .1633    .1428        
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
*significant at the .10 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level. 
 
 
 
